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ANTENUPTIAL TRANSFERS AS FRAUDS ON MARITAL
RIGHTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
PHILIP A. BREGY t and Roy WILKINSON, JR.'
The recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kirk v.
Kirk ' is more interesting than a casual reading might indicate. Indeed,
to one with merely a general knowledge of the law the decision itself
will probably be less startling than the fact that it constitutes a departure
from a rule which was commonly believed to have dated from seven-
teenth century England and which has been followed in this country
practically without dissent for well over a century.
A widower, three days before his second marriage and without
the knowledge of his intended wife, conveyed real estate to the children
of his first marriage. On little more than these findings, the lower
court, in a suit subsequent to the widower's death, held that the convey-
ance was a fraud on the marital right of the second wife and "void as
to her". The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial. "The
principle applied [by the lower court] was the fact of conveyance by
one of the parties to a treaty of marriage without the knowledge of
other was evidence of fraud, sufficient, unless rebutted, to avoid the
conveyance." 2 The court said that this "is not the law today," and
adopted the following principle: "Either spouse may challenge, as
fraudulent, a conveyance of real estate or a gift of personal property
made during a treaty of marriage, but mere proof of the conveyance
or gift, without the knowledge of the other party, does not constitute a
prima facie case of fraudulent transfer. In addition, it is necessary for
the party alleging it to prove the fraud, or 'actual fraud,' to use an
expression common in the decisions." 3
Even taken at its face value, as merely a shift in the burden of
proof, the decision would be important. Since few people have a very
clear idea of what constitutes fraud in novel and individualized situa-
tions, the importance of being required to prove fraud, instead of
permitting the defendant to prove the absence of it, is apparent. To
mention but a single example, whatever else the plaintiff must now
prove beyond the fact of the secret conveyance in order to show "actual
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1. 340 Pa. 203, i6 A. (2d) 47 (1940), (94) 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 524.
2. Kirk v. Kirk, 340 Pa. 203, 205, 16 A. (2d) 47, 48 (1940).
3. Id. at 207, 208, 16 A. (2d) at 50.
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fraud", probably he must at least establish the element of reliance-that
in marrying he relied on the other spouse's ownership of the property
in question. In other words, the attorney is placed in the unenviable
position of appealing to the conscience of a chancellor and is at the same
time required to prove that his client married for money. Add to this
the necessity of proving the requisite "fraudulent intent", whatever that
might be, and it becomes evident that the shift of the burden of proof
will ordinarily make the difference between success and failure.
But in practical effect, the decision means more than this. The rule
which was rejected has been variously described as a rule of presumed
fraud, constructive fraud, imputed fraud, and even fraud in law. As
will appear more fully later, this terminology is not entirely misleading,
for once the secret conveyance had been established, the fraud could be
"rebutted" only by showing equitable considerations to support the
transfer, e. g., that it was a reasonable provision for the children by a
former marriage, or to satisfy a moral obligation; proof that there was
no representation or reliance was apparently of no avail. In this sense,
the rejected doctrine was a rule of substantive law.
To understand the former rule as well as to evaluate the Pennsyl-
vania court's departure from it, it is necessary to examine an interesting
line of cases showing the doctrine's modest origin in England and its
subsequent development when imported into this country. As indicated
in the portion of the Kirk opinion quoted, the discarded doctrine not
only seemed to be based on the assumption that one has some sort of
legally protected interest in an intended spouse's property before mar-
riage, but also suggested that the law favors this interest to the extent
of implying a wrongful invasion of it from the mere fact of a secret
conveyance during the engagement. This, however, was not the rule
originally announced by the English courts.
Apparently the first reported case on the subject is Howard v.
Hooker,4 decided in 1673. There a widow had secretly deeded her
interest in her first husband's estate to a trustee for her sole and separate
use while she was engaged to her prospective second husband. The
evidence showed that previously her fiance, suspecting that she was
about to do just this, broke off the engagement "which was afterwards
brought on again by some Friends of the [widow] and that the [plain-
tiff] was induced to marry [her] upon the Hopes and Confidence of
having the Interest she had in the Estate of . . . her former husband,
without which he would never have married her . . ." In spite of
this, the widow nevertheless deeded the property. Upon discovering
4. 2 Chan. Rep. 81, 21 Eng. Rep. R. 622 (1672-3). See also Lance v. Norman, 2
Chan. Rep. 79, 21 Eng. Rep. R. 621 (1672-3), decided about the same time, but very
briefly reported.
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the fact after the marriage, the husband instituted a suit in equity and
was successful in having the deed set aside as a fraud on his marital
rights. Even from the sparse report, it is plain that this was a case
where fraud was actually proved rather than presumed, for the elements
of bad faith, misrepresentation, and reliance clearly appear. The woman
had used the device of a sole and separate use as a means of secretly
barring her intended husband's common-law interest in her property-
an interest which apparently constituted the man's sole reason for mar-
rying her. But before discussing other aspects of this case it is probably
advisable, by reviewing a few of the subsequent English decisions, to
demonstrate the evolution of the doctrine to its modern form.
Hunt v. Matthews 5 and King v. Cotton" are examples of the
restraint exercised by the early courts in applying the new principle.
They also constitute the foundation for the important qualification that
an antenuptial conveyance will not be set aside where there are equitable
considerations to support it. Thus, in the first case, it was decided that
the fact that the transfer was in favor of children of a former marriage
was sufficient to negative any idea of fraud.7 In King v. Cotton, the
conveyance was likewise for the benefit of children by a former mar-
riage and was made by a woman who had declared that if she married
again "her second husband would marry her for love." This was,
however, an even weaker case for setting aside the deed, for the convey-
ance was made openly and before her second engagement.
Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes 8 was another clear case against
setting aside the transfer, but, possibly because it was argued so stren-
uously by the plaintiff, long opinions were delivered and it has become
a leading authority. The facts are reminiscent of a Fielding novel or a
Sheridan play. The countess, a widow of fabulous wealth but of ques-
tionable intelligence, was engaged to one Grey, a nondescript character
who soon passed out of the picture. While so engaged, the countess
transferred her estate in trust for her sole and separate use. This was
done perfectly openly with the full knowledge and consent of Grey and
would have caused no difficulty had it not been for the appearance of a
man named Bowes-a lieutenant on half pay, "in a regiment of foot,
5. 1 Vern. 408, 23 Eng. Rep. R. 549 (1686).
6. 2 P. Wins. 674, 24 Eng. Rep. R. 912 (1732).
7. This case was later criticized on the ground that, while the general principle
was correct, the mere fact of provision for children by a former marriage is not suf-
ficient in itself to negative fraud. See Downs v. Jennings, 32 Beav. 290, 295, 55 Eng.
Rep. R. IH4, i6 (1863); i RopEr, REAL PROPERTY (1824) 16i; 2 VAIZEY, SEITLE-
IIENTS (1887) 1584.
8. 2 Cox 28, 3o Eng. Rep. R. 14, I Ves. jun. 22, 30 Eng. Rep. R. 211 (0789), aff'd
sub noin. Bowes v. Bowes, 6 Brown 427, 2 Eng. Rep. R. 1178 (H. L. 1797). See the
historical paper on this case by Shannon, The Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes (1923)
I CAN. B. REv. 425; it is interesting to note that that author treats the case merely as
a legal curiosity dealing with a principle that has become obsolete.
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and greatly distressed in his circumstances, and possessed of little or
no property." Bowes, not a man to sit idly by and observe so rich a
prize go to waste on Grey, "recommended himself to the [countess's]
notice, and ingratiated himself into her favor by various arts and con-
trivances, particularly by aspersing her character in the newspapers, and
afterwards pretending to vindicate her from such aspersions, by engag-
ing in a pretended duel . . ." The countess, who was "a woman
subject to sudden and violent impulses of generosity," rushed to comfort
him and found him "in his lodgings at St. James Street where he spoke
in a very low tone of voice, and affected to be languid and in great
torture, yet expressing . . . great anxiety to be united to her in
marriage before his death, which, he said, was fast approaching, and
that he did not expect to live twenty-four hours. . . ." She married
him the next day, Bowes "pursuing his imposition so far, as to be car-
ried to church on a litter." Naturally disappointed upon discovering
that she had conveyed away her property, Bowes sought to have the
deed set aside as a fraud on his marital rights. Of course he did not
succeed. As Chancellor Thurlow said, Bowes was scarcely the man "to
come into Equity and talk of fraud." On the contrary, he thought that
the countess's settlement of the property was the only sane thing she
had ever done.9 Since the transfer was made during the engagement
to Grey and with his assent, there was no possible fraud on Bowes, no
matter what rule was adopted. The only wonder is how the plaintiff
ever expected to win. The opinions of the chancellors, however, are
enlightening.
Justice Buller adhered to the strict rule of Howard v. Hooker. He
said: "Fraud, as applied to cases of this nature, is falsely holding out
an estate to be unfettered, and that the intended husband will, as such,
be entitled to it, when in fact it is disposed of from him: and in most
cases the husband appears to have actually made some settlement or
provision on the wife, on the faith of this . . . but the cases go no
further: and if any such proposition as is contended for can be main-
tained, that a bare concealment is in itself sufficient, it should be equally
fraudulent in law and in equity; and yet clearly it is not so at law: and
if such a deed were universally void, it would not signify whether it
were made in favor of a child of a former marriage or a stranger; yet
the cases of Hunt v. Matthews, and King v. Cotton, have determined
if such a settlement be made in favor of such a child it is good against
9. "Marriage in general seems to have been Lady Strathmore's object; she was
disposed to marry anybody, but not to part with her fortune. This settlement is to
be considered as the effect of a lucid interval, and, if there can be reason in madness,
by doing this she discovered a spark of understanding." I Ves. jun. 22, 28, 3o Eng.
Rep. R. 211, 214 (i789).
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a second husband, who had no notice of it." '0 But Lord Chancellor
Thurlow used language which was later interpreted as adopting a
broader rule. "If a woman during the course of a treaty of marriage
with her makes without notice to the intended husband a conveyance of
any part of her property, I should set it aside, though good prima facie,
because affected with that fraud." 11
The requirement of proving actual fraud, with representation and
reliance, retained its legal effectiveness, however, at least through 1813,
when Lord Eldon in DeManieville v. Crompton ' 2 refused to avoid a
voluntary cancellation of promissory notes by a woman on the eve of
her marriage. The rule, said the chancellor, "should not be carried to
the Extent, that, whenever any thing occurs in general treaty, not enter-
ing into Particulars, or showing, that the Marriage actually took place
upon such Representations, that Principle is to be applied to a Case, to
which it has no Application, and was never intended to be applied." '3
It will be seen, then, that the rule of presumed fraud was not estab-
lished in the English cases until relatively late in history-a fact slurred
over by most of the authorities.
14
The cases so far reviewed are entirely consistent with the rule
adopted by the Pennsylvania court in the Kirk case. The first clear
indication that mere proof of a secret transfer during the engagement
is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of fraud appears in Roper's
textbook on The Law of Property Arising from the Relation Between
Husband and Wife,'5 published in 1824. The rule in this form was
applied in Goddard v. Snow 16 and Roper's statement of the principle
was subsequently adopted by Vice-Chancellor Wigram in Taylor v.
Pugh,17 where the chancellor expressly repudiated Lord Eldon's opinion
and said: "Notwithstanding there are some dicta which may at first be
considered as implying the contrary (but which may, I think, be ex-
plained), I take the rule of the Court to be correctly stated in Mr.
Roper's treatise . . .: 'Deception will be inferred if, after the com-
10. 2 COX 28, 29-30, 30 Eng. Rep. R. 14-15 (1789).
ii. i Ves. jun. 22, 28, 30 Eng. Rep. R. 211, 214 (1789).
12. I V. & B. 354, 35 Eng. Rep. R. 138 (1813).
13. I V. & B. 354, 356, 35 Eng. Rep. R. 138, 139 (1813).
14. The incomplete reports of some earlier cases might make it appear that the
rule of presumed fraud was of more ancient origin. But see the reporter's comment in
2 Cox 28, 33, 30 Eng. Rep. R. 14, 16: "Carleton v. Earl of Dorset (2 Vern.
17, 23 Eng. Rep. R. 622 (1686)), which was the most material case in favor of Mr.
Bowes (as reported), appeared to be a case in which the wife had assured her second
husband that he should enjoy her estate, and therefore was a case of actual fraud . . .
Edmonds v. Dennington [unreported, but see brief note in i Eq. Ca. Abr. 59, 21 Eng.
Rep. R. 872] is nothing like what it is supposed to be from the mention of it in Ver-
I on. ,
15. Vol. i at 159 et seq.; compare the statement made by Chancellor Loughbor-
ough during the course of the argument in Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. jun. 191, 194,
30 Eng. Rep. R. 588, 590 (1793).
16. I Russ. 485, 38 Eng. Rep. R. 187 (1826).
17. I Hare 6o8, 66 Eng. Rep. R. 1173 (1842).
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mencement of the treaty of marriage, the wife should attempt to make
any disposition of her property without her intended husband's knowl-
edge or concurrence.'" 18 It was recognized, however, that the defend-
ant may rebut this inference of fraud by showing equitable considera-
tions for upholding the conveyance. Such considerations were found
in this case, and the decision is a good example of equity in the grand
style. It appeared that the plaintiff here had seduced the woman some
time before their marriage, putting her in a position where she could
not refuse him and thus depriving her of her bargaining power in con-
cluding a marriage settlement. For this reason the transfer was upheld.
With Taylor v. Pugh, therefore, the rule of presumed fraud was
established. 9  The transition was important and unfortunate. It
became more difficult for this phase of the law to keep pace with the
change in the concepts of marriage and the status of woman which
began with the romantic movement of the early nineteenth century, in
the course of years became part of the general mores of the people, and
finally was recognized by the law itself. To anyone familiar with the
cases on marriage 'settlements generally or even the literature and his-
tory of the period, it is evident that marriage was in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries a rather complicated business transaction.
The historical background of the cases recognizing that a man's expec-
tant interest in his intended wife's property will be protected in equity
is apparent from the opinions and arguments of counsel. Thus, for
example, it was argued in Strathmore v. Bowes, "A wife by the mar-
riage contract becomes extinct from the nature of it for several civil
purposes; with regard to which she merges in the husband. He becomes
liable to all her debts, and answerable for all her acts, that do not
amount to felony; and even for that, if committed in his presence;
because her mind is supposed to be under his coercion. In order to
enable him to answer this he has by the law all her property. It is
absurd to say, the wife shall by her own act deprive the husband of what
the law has given him. . . . If the wife can by her own act against
the consent of the husband make herself independent of him, it will
destroy that subordination so necessary in families; which is analogous
to that in the state, and tends to support it; for if Lady Strathmore is
right in this, the husband is become a cipher in his own house .. ,, 20
Chancellor Thurlow summed up the situation as follows: "The law
conveys the marital rights to the husband, because it charges him with
all the burthens, which are the consideration, he pays for them; there-
fore it is a right, upon which fraud may be committed. Out of this
I8. Id. at 614, 66 Eng. Rep. R. 1173, 1176.
i. Followed in Downes v. Jennings, 32 Beav. 290, 5 Eng. Rep. R. 114 (1863).
20. 1 Ves. jun. 22, 22a, 3o Eng. Rep. R. 211-212 (789).
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right arises a rule of law, that the husband shall not be cheated, on
account of his consideration." 21
The crux of the situation is that the rule of presumed fraud, stated
in Taylor v. Pugh, dispensed with the requirement of proving reliance,
and this was the element which would have become increasingly difficult
to prove as the years passed by. People may still marry for money,
but ordinarily without open admission of the fact; it is no longer
regarded as a normal and proper motive. Had the original doctrine of
Howard v. Hooker been retained, therefore, it would have remained
law but would have gradually fallen into disuse.
Be that as it may, the English Courts did not completely lose touch
with realities merely because the burden of proving fraud was lightened.
In the first place, the English authorities applied the rule only to ante-
nuptial transfers by the intended wife. Similar transfers by the intended
husband, even with intent to bar dower, were not subject to this type
of attack.2 2  The entire basis for the rule was the extraordinary and
present interests a husband had in his wife's real and personal property
at common law.28 In comparison, the expectancy of inchoate dower,
which even after marriage was merely the possibility of an estate,
2 4
was a shadow of a shadow. It was not an interest which would ordi-
narily constitute the inducement on the part of the woman for entering
into the marriage contract. A woman might well marry in the hopes
of sharing in her husband's wealth, but her legally enforceable rights in
this respect were comparatively insignificant. Today, the distinction
might well appear as an unfair discrimination against the woman; it
was, however, no more than the logical corollary of broader discrimi-
nations against women inherent in the common law.
Since the interests of a wife in her husband's property were con-
sidered too remote for antenuptial protection, it would seem to follow
that when the Married Woman's Property Act reduced the husband's
21. 1 Ves. jun. 22, 27, 30 Eng. Rep. R. 211, 214 (1789) ; see also Chancellor Bul-
ler's language, quoted pp. 65-66 supra.
22. See i ROPER, REAL PROPEaTY (2d ed. with Jacob's notes, 1841) 354 L U, 32
Law Library 215 n.; 2 VAIZEY, SEIMEMENT$ (1887) x587. In M'Keogh v. M'Keogh,
4 Ir. R. Eq. 338, 346-7 (187o) it is said: "That doctrine depends on the principle of
law that the husband, by the fact of marriage, becomes entitled absolutely to the wife's
personalty, and to a certain interest in her real estate, in consideration of which he
undertakes a liability for her debts, and, incurs other legal obligations for her; and any
secret attempt to withdraw any portion of the property of the intended wife during the
treaty of marriage from thus passing to the husband is deemed by this Court a fraud
on his marital rights. If it were necessary for me to decide this case upon that con-
tention, I should hold that that doctrine does not apply in principle, and has not ever
been applied by authority, to the case of a security like this, given by the intended
husbahd on the eve of marriage. The only dealing by an intended husband with his
property which was at any time supposed to be a fraud upon the rights of the intended
wife was a secret conveyance to bar dower, but even this was held by Lord Hardwicke
not to be fraudulent."
23. See, generally, 2 TIFFANY, RMAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 484 et seq.
24. Id. § 533; see also § 487.
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interest to substantially that of the wife,2 5 the doctrine would no longer
apply to a woman's antenuptial transfers. Thus it was suggested by
Vaizey,2 6 in discussing the effect of the English Act of 1882, that: "In
the old sense, therefore, of the husband being deprived of something to
which as husband he would have had a right if the wife had not before
marriage executed a conveyance, fraud on marital right does not appear
to be any longer possible. It must, however, be remembered that the
change is effected not by abrogation of the doctrine, but by withdrawal
of the subject-matter to which it is capable of application." This was
the decision of the Scottish Court of Sessions in Lyon v. Lyon's
Trustee,2 7 where the court considered the interests remaining in the
husband after the Act "too remote" to support an action to set aside a
secret deed by the woman during a treaty of marriage. Apparently,
therefore, the doctrine of presumed fraud has now been abandoned in
England, though relief will still probably be granted in those extraor-
dinary cases where actual fraud can be proved. 28
An interesting dictum by Justice Brewer, then of the Supreme
Court of Kansas, suggested a similar abrogation of the doctrine of
antenuptial fraud in this country as a result of statutory modification
of marital rights. After pointing out the difficulty of finding fraud in
a gift of personal property, he considered the still-remaining reciprocal
rights of each spouse in the other's real estate and asked: "But is this
inchoate interest, which may never ripen into a complete title, and which
is subject to be defeated during marriage by judicial sale and thereafter
by the payment of debts, such an interest as will justify a court in
pronouncing fraudulent and void the ante-nuptial voluntary conveyance
of either husband or wife? But it is not necessary to decide this ques-
tion, and the court declines to express any opinion thereon." 29
Most American courts have answered Justice Brewer's question in
the affirmative and held that even an inchoate marital right is sufficient
to support a presumption of fraud from a secret antenuptial conveyance.
It was early decided that the doctrine should apply to antenuptial con-
veyances by the man as well as by the woman, and this seems to have
25. Id. § 552.
26. 2 VA=EY, SEr TE ENTs (1887) 1586.
27. 3 Ct. of Session Cases 653 (Scotland, igoi).
28. Cf. M'Keogh v. M'Keogh, 4 Ir. R. Eq. 338 (i87o), cited note 22 mtpra, where
although the rule of presumed fraud was rejected in a case involving a transfer by the
intended husband, actual fraud was proved and relief granted.
29. Butler v. Butler, 21 Kan. 521, 526 (187g) ; the actual decision was that the
conveyance was made before the marriage contract, constituted a reasonable provision
for minor children, and hence was valid no matter what rule was applied. Cf. 2
POmER Y, EQurry (1918) § 920; 3 Id. (919) § 1113, where it is baldly stated that
modern legislation has made the early doctrine of antenuptial fraud obsolete-citing
no cases. In Tracy v. Thatcher, 135 Kan. 615, 11 P. (2d) 69i (1932) proof of actual
fraud was required in a brief opinion which did not discuss the rule of presumed fraud
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been generally accepted.30 The most carefully considered opinion to
this effect is Chandler v. Hollingsworth,3 with the rationale that the
rule was not applied to an intended husband's conveyance in England
because dower in that country could be barred prior to marriage by
various devices, among them a conveyance to use or, after the Statute
of Uses, by a jointure under the Statute of Henry VIII; in this country
where jointures are unknown, the distinction was said to have no place.
There is in this type of reasoning, of course, a logical difficulty. Before
marriage, the expectancy of dower was precarious in England because
it was not given antenuptial protection; it can scarcely be argued either
that it should or should not be so protected in this country because it
is or is not precarious here.3 2 The nature of the interest after marriage
should control, and this, at common law, was the same in both countries.
It would not be entirely unreasonable, however, to hold, contrary to the
English law, that inchoate dower is a sufficiently substantial interest to
cause a woman ordinarily to rely on it as an inducement for marriage,
and hence the rule of presumed fraud should apply. This would seem
to be the best justification for the American decisions, although the rule
so applied constitutes a radical extension of the original doctrine of
Howard v. Hooker. A rule designed to protect a husband's extraor-
dinary common-law interests from actually fraudulent antenuptial trans-
fers had developed through a series of minor transitions to a point where
it protected a contingent marital right from any secret conveyance
during a treaty of marriage.
33
The American courts, in their enthusiasm for the rule, applied it
to protect any interest, no matter how tenuous, one spouse might have
in the other's property as a result of marriage. Thus, even where dower
had been abolished by statute, an antenuptial conveyance was set aside
as a fraud on the wife's homestead rights.34 The courts which gave the
matter any thought seemed to admit that the doctrine would not apply
where the marital interest was no more than that of an expectant heir,
as in the case of a husband's gift of personal property,35 but anything
more than this was in general afforded antenuptial protection.
In Pennsylvania, however, the law on the subject was not settled.
The first case came before the Supreme Court in 1859. At that time,
30. Kelly v. McGrath, 70 Ala. 75 (1881); Cranson v. Cranson, 4 Mich. 230
(1856); Swaine v. Perine, 5 Johns. Ch. 482 (N. Y. 1821); see Arnegaard v. Arne-
gaard, 7 N. D. 475, 75 N. W. 797 (1898) ; cases collected in 2 T=ANy, RntAL, PROP-
ERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 5o6.
31. 3 Del. Ch. 99 (1867).
32. Cf. (I935) 35 COL. L. REv. 113, 114-5.
33. With the exceptions noted in the case of a transfer supported by equitable con-
siderations.
34. Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N. D. 475, 75 N. W. 797 (I898).
35. See 13 R. C. L. § IO4. But see the recent decision of LeStrange v. LeStrange,
242 App. Div. 74, 273 N. Y. Supp. 2r (N. Y. 2d Dep't 1934), (1935) 35 CoL. L. REV.
113, (1935) 20 CORN. L. Q. 381. This case, however, probably involved actual fraud.
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the marital rights of the husband were limited by the Act of 1848,3"
which provided that all property "whether consisting of real, personal
or mixed, which may be owned by or belong to any single woman, shall
continue to be the property of such woman, as fully after her marriage
as before . . . ." This act was construed to put a married woman's
property beyond the reach of the husband or his creditors, but not to
add anything to the wife's powers over it. Hence she could not dis-
pose of her property without her husband's consent after the act any
more than before. 37 Under the Act of 1855,38 a husband could take his
intestate interest in real and personal property against the wife's will."
Thus, although the husband's present interests at common law were
wiped out, he retained a contingent interest in a portion of her property
which would ripen on her death if he survived her. This was the back-
ground of Belt v. Ferguson,40 where the lower court had set aside a
deed for separate use made by a woman before marriage without her
intended husband's consent. In a rather casual per curiam opinion of
fourteen lines, the Supreme Court affirmed. Apparently the effect of
the Act of 1848 was argued but the opinion simply stated that there
was "nothing in that act to affect the rule."
This case was followed by Duncan's Appeal 4l and Robinson v.
Buck,42 where the rule of presumed fraud was applied to set aside
transfers of both real and personal property by women immediately
before their marriages. Neither opinion discusses the merits of the
principle which, it was said, had "stood the test of experience too long
to be open to dispute now." Since at the dates of those decisions a
husband would have at the death of the wife an interest in her property,
both real and personal, which she could not have disposed of during
coverture without his consent, these holdings are justifiable, at least
under the American extension of the rule. They were decided, how-
ever, in ill-considered opinions which gave no attention to the exact
nature of the interest being protected. Thus the stage was set for the
confusion that followed.
In Ross's Appea, 43 the wife attacked the validity of sealed notes
executed by the husband the day he married her. This was apparently
the first Pennsylvania case dealing with a transfer by an intended hus-
36. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 48, § 64.
37. See Haffey v. Carey, 73 Pa. 431 (1873) ; Moore v. Cornell, 68 Pa. 320, 323
(1871); Haines v. Ellis, 24 Pa. 253, 255 (1855); Keen v. City, 8 Phila. 49 (Pa.
1871) ; HUSBANDS, LAW OF MAPRIED WOmEN IN PENNSYLVANIA (1878) § 64.
38. P. L. 430 (1855).
39. See HusBANDs, MARRiED WomN (1878) § 153.
40. 3 Grant 289 (Pa. 1859) ; cf. In re Guardians of Elliot, 2 Clarke 1, 5 (Pa. L.
J. Rep. 1843).
41. 43 Pa. 67 (1862).
42. 71 Pa. 386 (1872).
43. 127 Pa. 4, 17 At. 682 (1889).
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band and since it concerned a transfer of personal property, over which
he would still have absolute dominion after marriage, it was clearly a
case where the rules relating to antenuptial fraud could have no appli-
cation. The notes were upheld, however, only because they were said
to constitute a reasonable provision for children of a former marriage.
Potter v. Fidelity Co..44 decided in 19O1, also involved a man's
antenuptial transfer of personal property. The Supreme Court adopted
the opinion of Judge Willson in the lower court which refused relief
to the wife who sued during the husband's lifetime. The precise ground
for this decision is not clear. Although the rule of Duncan's Appeal 
45
was recognized as retaining legal significance in regard to transfers by
an intended wife (a doubtful point in itself, as will be subsequently
indicated), it was doubted whether a similar doctrine could be applied
to a husband's gifts in view of his absolute control over his personalty
even after marriage. This, of course, was correct and should have
decided the case. Instead, -the bill was held bad merely because it had
been brought during the lifetime of the husband, and, ignoring every-
thing that had been said previously in the opinion, the judge suggested
that if the husband predeceased her, the wife would "'undoubtedly" have
the right to set aside the gift.
Windolph v. Girard Trust Co.46 concerned a trust deed of personal
property made by a married woman during coverture. It is a leading
case to the effect that pursuant to the Act of I893,'4 a married woman
during coverture may dispose of her personal property as freely as her
husband may dispose of his. For some reason, however, the court
was concerned about the setting aside of the woman's antenuptial
transfer of personalty in Duncan's Appeal, discussed above. That case
should have given no difficulty in this respect for it was decided under
the Act of 1848, which, as has been stated, did not increase a married
woman's dominion over her property. Instead of merely indicating
that fact, the court revived Duncan's Appeal, distinguishing it on the
ground that there an antenuptial transfer was involved and not, as here,
a transfer during coverture. No explanation was given for the rather
curious suggestion that a wife has less dominion over her property
before marriage than afterward.
48
44. No. 2, 199 Pa. 366, 49 At. 86 (1goi) ; cf. Coleman's Estate, 193 Pa. 6o$, 44
Atl. xo85 (1899) (where the deed was made prior to the engagement) ; Barnhart v.
Grantham, 197 Pa. 502, 47 Atl. 866 (igol) (a case of actual fraud).
45. 42 Pa. 67 (1862), cited p. 71 supra.
46. 245 Pa. 349, 91 Atl. 634 (1914).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 48, § 31 et seq.; supplanting Act of 1887,
P. L. 332.
48. 245 Pa. 349 at 367, 91 Atl. 634 at 639 (1914). It might be argued that the
distinction can be justified on the tacit assumption of the common law that a woman
has no mind of her own but is always being coerced by somebody. Thus, the position
might be taken that a man has a right to have the property of his intended wife pro-
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In Weaver v. Welh,49 a Superior Court case decided in I919, a
man, the day before he married, had secretly conveyed away some real
estate to his sister. Ejectment was brought by the grantee of the sister
against the wife, while the husband was still living. Following Potter
v. Fidelity Co., the court held that the wife's defense of fraud was not
available to her until after the husband's death. But the opinion did
not stop there; it went on to quote the long dictum in the Potter case
which threw doubt on the wife's right to relief in any event because of
the husband's absolute dominion over his property. It is plain, how-
ever, that such reasoning could not be applied to a conveyance of real
estate, because, unlike personalty, real property may not be alienated by
a married man free of his wife's dower even under modern statutes.50
The confusion with regard to antenuptial transfers of personalty
was finally clarified by the holding of Fritz's Estate,5' where a husband's
sealed note, executed three days before his marriage, was upheld as
against the claim of the wife. The Superior Court merely relied on the
cases dealing with a husband's absolute dominion over his personal
property during marriage. Although the problems created by the older
cases were ignored rather than solved, the decision is clearly correct.
The only interest either spouse has in the other's personal property today
is merely the hope of an expectant heir. Certainly fraud should not be
presumed from a gift the day before the wedding when it could not have
been attacked if made the day after.
When Kirk v. Kirk came before the Supreme Court, therefore, the
Pennsylvania law was in flux. From the above review of the cases, it
will be seen that the only actual holdings in support of the rule of
presumed fraud were Belt v. Ferguson, Duncan's Appeal, and Robinson
v. Buck, all cases concerning transfers by the intended wife and decided
prior to the Married Woman's Property Act of 1893.52 There were
no appellate decisions actually applying the rule to transfers by the
intended husband 53 or to a woman's transfers after 1893. The dicta
in support of so extending the rule were numerous but conflicting and
unreliable. The suggestions that the rule should be applied to all ante-
nuptial transfers, even of personalty, over which each spouse now has
absolute dominion after marriage, were plainly wrong and contrary to
the holding of the Superior Court in Fritz's Estate. Yet there was no
indication that a different rule should be applied to conveyances of real
tected from the coercion of her father or brother until he marries her and is in a posi-
tion to coerce her himself.
49. 7i Pa. Super. 184 (i919).
5o. Bridgeford v. Groh, 3o6 Pa. 566 i6o Atl 45i (,932).
51. 135 Pa. Super. 463, 5 A. (2d) 6o1 (935).
52. P. L. 344 (893).
53. Baird v. Sterne, i5 Phila. 339 (C. P. Pa. 1882) applied the rule to set aside
a husband's conveyance, but the case was not appealed.
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estate. The suggestions in Potter v. Fidelity Co. and Weaver v. Welsh
that the rule applicable to a woman's transfer should not be applied to
transfers by the man might have had some validity at common law.
But at the time the suggestions were made, when the respective marital
property rights of each spouse were substantially equal, this was not
true.
5 4
The state of the decisions indicated the necessity for a re-exami-
nation of the current application of the rule. For the reasons already
discussed, the suggestions that fraud could be presumed from a secret
antenuptial gift of personalty were easily rejected and Fritz's Estate
followed. There remained, however, the problem of conveyances of
real estate, where the situation was somewhat different: even under the
Act of 1893, a married woman is still unable to convey her real estate
without her husband's consent, and, conversely, a married man is still
unable to convey his land free of the statutory equivalent of dower
unless his wife joins. With the additional power of each spouse to take
against the other's will, it is evident that each spouse has an interest in
the other's real property analogous to inchoate dower at common law,
an interest which lies between a contingent estate and a bare expectancy.
It might well be argued that this interest should be protected by the rule
of presumed fraud under the American interpretation of the doctrine.
The Supreme Court in the Kirk case, however, going back to the orig-
inal rationale of the rule in England, stated that the hope of sharing in
the other spouse's real estate was not "such a present and certain interest
as . . .would ordinarily constitute the consideration for marital obli-
gations." 55 The opinion did not preclude the possibility of proving
that the marital interest in the other's real property did constitute the
inducement for marriage in a particular case; it merely rejected the
tacit assumption that all marriages are consummated with this purpose
in mind. Reliance is no longer presumed; it must be proved.
Implicit in the Kirk decision is a clarification of the nature of the
fraud which gives rise to the power to set aside an antenuptial transfer,
for the presumption applied in the prior cases had tended to obscure the
basis of the equitable right. It will be noted in this respect that there is
no uniform meaning to the term fraud. On the one hand the term is
used to describe unconscionable dealings which induce a disadvanta-
geous change of position on the part of another and give rise to an
54. In view of this state of the law, it is perhaps excusable that the following
rather puzzling statement was recently made in what is otherwise a very enlightening
treatise: "Although much shaken recently, the rule seems to be that a transfer or lien
by a spouse, either in contemplation of or after marriage, with the intent to deprive
the other spouse of his or her maritaly property rights is fradulent." (Footnotes omit-
ted.) BusHoNG, PENNSYLVANIA LAND LAw (1938) § 670.
55. 340 Pa. 203, 207, 16 A. (2d) 47, 50 (I94O), with which compare Justice Brew-
er's dicta, note 26 supra.
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action for deceit " or a proceeding to set aside a contract so induced; '7
here misrepresentation and reliance are important. On the other hand,
the term fraud is used to describe a voluntary transfer by an insolvent
debtor. 58 In this latter situation the entire theory of the wrong is radi-
cally different; the law seems to recognize that one has certain rights in
his debtor's property with which there can be wrongful interference
regardless of intent, misrepresentation or reliance. The remedy in the
insolvency cases, moreover, is obviously not to set aside the contract of
indebtedness nor to bring an action for damages, but to set aside the
transfer itself. A conveyance during coverture "in fraud of dower" is
analogous to a transfer in fraud of creditors in that the interest of the
wife is attached to the land and cannot be defeated regardless of the
good faith of the parties. An antenuptial transfer, however, has never
been so regarded. No matter how far the presumption of fraud is
carried, it is nevertheless fraud in the first sense described-in the sense
of unconscionable dealings inducing an injurious change of position.
This is evident if only from the fact that the secrecy of the transaction
is in all cases a necessary element; if the intended spouse is informed
of the transaction, he obviously cannot complain. But the peculiarity
of this type of wrong is that while the fraud is of the kind that in other
situations gives rise to an action for deceit or a proceeding to set aside
the contract, the remedy here is to set aside the transfer. The reason
for this is plain. Since the injury complained of is the depletion of the
other spouse's estate, an action' for deceit against the estate would
scarcely be profitable. The annulment of the marriage would likewise
be inapproprate even if annulments or divorces could be granted on
this ground, which, of course, they cannot.59 That equity has chosen
the only particular remedy available, and that this remedy happens to
be similar to that granted in insolvency proceedings, should not cause
confusion. The fraud complained of is still fraud in the first sense.
The danger of drawing false analogies, however, is apparent where the
very elements of this type of fraud, misrepresentation and reliance, are
presumed rather than proved. This particular aspect of the problem
was not discussed in the Kirk opinion but an awareness of the problem
is suggested by a cryptic footnote referring to Harlan v. Maclaughlin,60
a case holding that proof of actual fraud is necessary to set aside a
transfer by a debtor prejudicial to future creditors; the suggested anal-
ogy is interesting and rather instructive. The important thing, how-
ever, is that the decision, in requiring proof of fraud, makes clear that
56. Emery v. Third Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh, 314 Pa. 544, 171 Atl. 88i (I934).
57. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Brandwene, 316 Pa. 218, 172 Atl. 669 (934).
58. See PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 39, § 354 et seq.
59. See Hannah Allen's Appeal, 99 Pa. r96,- 2o0 (i88a).
6o. go Pa. 293 (i879).
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the basis of the suit is fraud in its pure sense rather than a wrongful
interference with some sort of a property right.
The nature of the burden now on the plaintiff of proving actual
fraud remains an open question. In the case of an antenuptial transfer
of personal property, clearly the burden would be as heavy as that of
proving fraud in such a transfer during marriage, where it is well estab-
lished that even an intent to bar the other spouse's intestate rights is
insufficient to establish fraud. Anything more than a mere colorable
transfer, therefore, can no longer be avoided.01
In the case of an antenuptial conveyance of real estate the burden
will be somewhat lighter. Unlike the hope of succeeding to the other
spouse's personal estate, the interest of one spouse in the other's real
estate, while remote and contingent, is something more than the mere
hope of an expectant heir. The extent of the proof now necessary to
show fraud, however, did not arise in the Kirk appeal, and the opinion
expressly left this question open. "For example, can it be shown that
Mr. Kirk made any representation to plaintiff of his existing property,
what the representation was, and whether it was relied on? Did he,
in making the conveyance, intend to satisfy an existing obligation to
his grantees . . . in circumstances in which the effect on his intended
wife's future rights in this property would, in a legal sense, be only
incidental? . . . Or, did he make the conveyance, not to satisfy a
bona fide obligation, but with the intention of depriving her of rights
which, expressly or by implication, he induced her to believe she would
receive by marrying him? We are not attempting to limit or define the
scope of the inquiry but merely to illustrate its general nature." 62
Proof of plaintiff's reliance and the transferor's intent will ordinarily
be difficult; 63 but while the Kirk decision abolishes the legal presump-
tions, it does not interfere with the power of a chancellor to draw rea-
sonable inferences from all the evidence in the case.
Proof of actual fraud, therefore, will not be impossible, although
recovery will be limited to rather unusual situations. With the abolition
of the special presumptions favoring this type of suit, the cycle is now
completed. The rule which was first suggested by isolated statements
of the English chancellors, which was adopted by textwriters, then
found its way into the decisions, and was extended far beyond its
original scope by the American courts, has now been discarded. Once
more, equity will grant relief only on facts analogous to those in the
original case of Howard v. Hooker.
61. See review of the Pennsylvania cases in Note (1939) 5 U. OF Prrr. L. REv. 78.
62. 340 Pa. 203, 208, 16 A. (2d) 47, 50 (940).
63. The dead man rule will add to this difficulty where the suit is brought after
the other spouse's death.
